

# NETWORK SECURITY 1

**KENET TRAINING**

# Layer 2 Security

- The BP recommendations for switch port security depend on the following characterizations
  - Unused ports
  - User ports
  - Trusted ports/trunk ports

# Strategies: Used and Unused Ports

- Disable unneeded dynamic protocols like CDP and DTP
- Disable trunking
- Enable BPDU Guard and Root Guard to prevent STP attacks
- Enable DAI or Private VLANs
- Enable port security. Limit Mac addresses
- Use 802.1X user authentication
- Use DHCP snooping and IP Source Guard to prevent DHCP DoS and man in the middle attacks

# Additional Recommendations

- Port Security
- Understanding Switch Security Issues
- Protecting Against VLAN Attacks
- Protecting Against Spoofing Attacks
- Securing Network Services
- Secure Network Switches to Mitigate Security Attack

# Port Security

## VULNERABILITIES

A switch that does not provide port security allows an attacker to attach a system to an unused, enabled port and to perform information gathering or attacks

## Counter Measures

- Shutdown unused ports
- Enable only specific mac- addresses on specific ports
- Configure port security violation
- Specify specific on all trunk links

e.g, **switchport port-security mac-address sticky**

**errdisable recovery cause psecure-violation** global config to unshut a port

# VLAN SECURITY

## VULNERABILITIES

By default all ports are on VLAN 1 .Private VLANs (P-VLANs) separated on layer 2 but not necessarily layer 3.VTP allows the addition, deletion and renaming of VLANs on a network-wide basis within a VTP management domain.

Using DTP configurations whose DTP trunking mode is Dynamic desirable

## Counter Measures

- Don't use VLAN 1 for management
- Propagate the Management VLAN on links that connect to your switches only
- Don't trunk the management VLAN off the switch. Use dedicated switch for that
- Combine PVLANS with Router ACLs
- Generally best to disable VTP or set on transparent mode, password protected. If you have to use VTP then upgrade the switch IOS and use VTP version 3
- Disable automatic trunking. Make the interfaces either DTP Protocol negotiate or non-negotiate. Hard code the interfaces whenever possible.

# VLAN SECURITY Cont.

## Counter Measures

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- Propagate the Management VLAN on links that connect to your switches only  
Combine PVLANS with Router ACLs
- Generally best to disable VTP or set on transparent mode, password protected.  
If you have to use VTP then upgrade the switch IOS and use VTP version 3
- Disable automatic trunking. Make the interfaces either DTP Protocol negotiate or non-negotiate. Hard code the interfaces whenever possible.
- Set switch-port as either trunk or access not auto negotiate
- Allow only specific VLANS on the trunk
- Use unique native VLAN for each trunk on a switch

# SPANNING TREE PROTOCOL

A vulnerability associated with STP is that a system within the network can actively modify the STP topology. There is no authentication that would prevent such an action. The bridge ID, a combination of priority (less is best) and MAC address(lower is best), determines the root bridge within a network.

## Counter Measures

- Using portfast BPDU guard to enforce STP topology. Global or port configuration. spanning-tree portfast bpduguard default spanning-tree portfast bpduguard default.
- Using spanning tree root guard. Allows participation in STP unless port attempts to become a root port
- STP bridge assurance
- STP dispute
- Configuration setting. Switch(config-if)# spanning-tree guard root



# SPANNING TREE PROTOCOL Cont

- **UDLD** – Uni-Directional Link Detection puts unidirectional links into blocking state and prevents forwarding loops.
- **BPDU Guard** – disables ports that receive a BPDU frame; useful for edge ports that should never be connected to another switch.
- **Loop Guard** – Protects against ports where the link becomes unidirectional. It operates differently than the UDLD function.
- **Root Guard** – Prevents a port from becoming a root port or a blocked port.
- **EtherChannel Guard** – Prevents inconsistent configuration of EtherChannel that creates loops between two switches.
- **Bridge Priority** – Defines the root bridge in an STP domain

# Bridge Assurance

Bridge Assurance only runs in RSTP or MST networks. It makes sure that a neighboring switch does not malfunction and begin forwarding frames when it shouldn't. It does this by monitoring receipt of BPDUs on point-to-point links. When the BPDUs stop being received, the port is put into blocking state (actually a port inconsistent state, which stops forwarding). When BPDUs restart, the port resumes normal RSTP or MST modes. This handles unidirectional links as well as the malfunction of a neighboring switch where STP stops sending BPDUs but the switch continues to forward frames.

# STP DISPUTE

Currently, this feature is not present in the IEEE MST standard, but it is included in the standard-compliant implementation. The software checks the consistency of the port role and state in the received BPDUs to detect unidirectional link failures that could cause bridging loops.

When a designated port detects a conflict, it keeps its role, but reverts to a discarding state because disrupting connectivity in case of inconsistency is preferable to opening a bridging loop.

# Access control lists

## **VULNERABILITIES**

- Lack of ACLs or very permissive ACLs. Remember that ACLs deny or permit access based on the 1st ACL statement that the packet matches.
- Poorly designed ACLs can also affect services that use protocols such as SIP, H.323 etc

## **COUNTERMEASURES**

Categorize systems attached to the switches into groups that use the same network services. Grouping systems this way helps reduce the size and complexity of associated ACLs.

# Logging and Debugging

## **VULNERABILITES**

- Poor configuration and monitoring leads to inadequate information on attacks

## **COUNTERMEASURES**

- Enable logging
- Configure appropriate trap levels
- Set up a separate logging server
- Ensure you have a good NTP server

# Questions



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# Thank You

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