

# SWITCHING SECURITY

PRESENTED BY: Michelle  
Opiyo

# Switching security

- Port Security
- Understanding Switch Security Issues
- Protecting Against VLAN Attacks
- Protecting Against Spoofing Attacks
- Securing Network Services
- Secure Network Switches to Mitigate Security Attack

# PORT SECURITY

## VULNERABILITIES

- A switch that does not provide port security allows an attacker to attach a system to an unused, enabled port and to perform information gathering or attacks.

## COUNTERMEASURES

- Shutdown unused ports
- Enable only specific mac- addresses on specific ports

e.g, **switchport port-security mac-address sticky**

**errdisable recovery**  
**cause psecure-violation** global  
config to unshut a port

# VLAN ATTACKS

## **VULNERABILITIES**

- By default all ports are on VLAN 1
- Private VLANs (P-VLANs) separated on layer 2 but not necessarily layer 3
- VTP allows the addition, deletion and renaming of VLANs on a network-wide basis within a VTP management domain.

## **COUNTERMEASURES**

- Don't use VLAN for management
- Don't trunk the management VLAN off the switch. Use dedicated switch for that
- Combine PVLANS with Router ACLs
- Generally best to disable VTP or set on transparent mode, password protected

# CONT'D...

## **VULNERABILITIES**

- Using DTP whose default setting is dynamic desirable

## **COUNTERMEASURES**

- Set switch-port as either trunk or access not auto negotiate
- Allow only specific VLANS on the trunk
- Use unique native VLAN for each trunk on a switch

# SPANNING TREE PROTOCOL

## VULNERABILITIES

- A vulnerability associated with STP is that a system within the network can actively modify the STP topology. There is no authentication that would prevent such an action. The bridge ID, a combination of priority (less is best) and MAC address(lower is best), determines the root bridge within a network.

## COUNTERMEASURES

- Using portfast BPDU guard to enforce STP topology. Global or port configuration. spanning-tree portfast bpduguard default
- Using spanning tree root guard. Allows participation in STP unless port attempts to become a root port. Switch(config-if)# spanning-tree guard root

# ACCESS CONTROL LISTS

## VULNERABILITIES

- Lack of ACLs or very permissive ACLs. Remember that ACLs deny or permit access based on the 1st ACL statement that the packet matches.
- Poorly designed ACLs can also affect services that use protocols such as SIP, H.323 etc

## COUNTERMEASURES

- Categorize systems attached to the switches into groups that use the same network services. Grouping systems this way helps reduce the size and complexity of associated ACLs.

# LOGGING AND DEBUGGING

## VULNERABILITIES

- Poor configuration and monitoring leads to inadequate information on attacks

## COUNTERMEASURES

- Enable logging
- Configure appropriate trap levels
- Set up a separate logging server
- Ensure you have a good NTP server

QUESTIONS?